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NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE INFERIOR COURT AND JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from that certain denial of defendant's
Motion To Set Aside Guilty Plea rendered by the Honorable Homer
F. Wilkinson, on September 21, 1987, in the Summit County District
Court, State of Utah, and from judgment of guilt following a plea
of negotiation and plea of guilt on June 1, 1987, in the same court.
The above appeal is brought pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellant Procedure, Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and the U.C.A. 78-2-2 (allowing Supreme Court to review
all final judgments of the District Court).
Defendant's Notice of Appeal was timely filed on November 16, 19 87.
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NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE INFERIOR COURT AND JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from that certain denial of defendant's
Motion To Set Aside Guilty Plea rendered by the Honorable Homer
F. Wilkinson, on September 21, 1987, in the Summit County District
Court, State of Utah, and from a judgment of guilt following a plea
of negotiation and plea of guilt on June 1, 19 87, in the same court.
Defendant's Notice of Appeal was timely filed on November 16,
1987.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

1)

Is it an abusive discretion for a trial judge to deny a

Motion To Set Aside Guilty Plea when that guilty plea was taken
as part of a plea bargain based on the results of a polygraph
examination?
2)

Is it proper to base a plea bargain necessitating a plea

of guilt to a felony on the basis of a polygraph examination?
3)

Do the results of the defendants polygraph indicate

deception pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement herein?

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated 77-35-11 (e) The court may refuse to accept
a plea of guilty or no contest and shall not accept such a plea
until the court has made the findings:
1)

That if the defendant is not represented by counsel he

has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
2)

That plea is voluntarily made;

3)

That the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory

self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to confront and crossexamine in open court the witnesses against him, and that by entering
the plea he waives all of those rights;
4)

That the defendant understands the nature and elements of

the offense to which he is entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements
beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an admission of all
those elements;
-2-

STATUTES
5)

(cont.)

That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence

that may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences; and
6)

Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea is

a result of a prior plea discussion

and plea agreement and if so,

what agreement has been reached.
Utah Code Annotated 77-13-6.
at any time prior to convictio.

A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn
A plea of guilty or no contest may

be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant was charged with theft, a second degree felony
in Summit County where he allegedly embezzled funds while he was
employed by a Park City hotel.

The defendant and the plaintiff

entered into a plea agreement contained in the record at 0011,
and entitled "Affidavit of Defendant."

That pursuant to said

plea agreement defendant was to submit to a polygraph examination.
If the results of the said polygraph examination are conclusive
in the opinion of the operator that the defendant was involved
in a theft, then the plea will stand, but if the polygraph results
are conclusive that the defendant was not involved in a theft,
then the State will move to dismiss the charges.

If the polygraph

results are inconclusive as of theft, the defendant shall have
the option to move to set aside his guilty plea.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

A conditional plea agreement is not voluntary or knowing

where a defendant is not advised as to the nature and possible
unreliability of the polygraph.
2.

A conditional plea agreement should be void where it is

based on performance on a polygraph where there is no judicial review
of the results and where there is no authority for such an arrangement.
3.

It cannot be said that as a matter of law, a defendant failed

a polygraph where one examiner graded the results as inconclusive.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IS IT AN ABUSIVE DISCRETION FOR A TRIAL JUDGE TO
DENY A MOTION TO SET ASIDE GUILTY PLEA WHEN THAT
GUILTY PLEA WAS TAKEN AS PART OF A PLEA BARGAIN
BASED ON THE RESULTS OF A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION?
As the Affidavit of the defendant (Rule 0011 to 0016) states,
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the defendant entered into his plea of guilt to third degree
felony theft on the partial basis that his plea would be set aside
if his subsequent poygraph examination was conclusive that he was
not involved in a theft.

(It is unclear form the Affidavit alone

what the State's position would be if the polygraph results were
inconclusive except that the defendant may make the motion to set
aside his plea. Record 0014.
It is the conditioning of the entry of a guilty plea based upon
the results of an a posteriori polygraph examination that the defendant
claims in error; not because of the inherent unreliability of the
device which will be argued below, but because the reliance of the
device by the defendant was not properly explained to him, and
rendered the plea involuntary.
Utah Code Annotated 77-35-11 (e) states (in relevant part) that
the court shall not accept a guilty plea until the court has made a
finding that the plea was voluntarily made.
The defendant argues that unless the vagaries of polygraph
examinations are adequately explained, basing a plea of guilt on
the examination will permit a defendant to successfully argue when
he fails the examination that he thought he would pass, the test
thusly showing his lack of guilt and vitiating the plea agreement.
In the case at bar, can it be argued by the plaintiff that the
plea was voluntarily received when the defendant had the option
of nullifying the plea by passing a test that the results of which
may be out of control.
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In State vs. Vasilacopulos, 84 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, (June 1988)
the court found the defendant's guilty plea was not properly receives
where he was not advised of the possibility of consecutive sentences.
Where a defendant was not advised of the fallibility of the polygraph
or the fact that he had the right to have the examination conducted
according to certain standards, or his right to a hearing and a
finding as to if his results fell into ehich category of the plea
agreement, it is urged that the voluntariness of the plea is suspect.
The defendant contends that the burden is to clearly establish
that the court has abused its discretion in finding whether or not
good cause has been shown in setting aside a plea of guilt.

State

vs. Mildenhall, 747 P. 2d 422 (Utah 1987).
The defendant believes he can meet his burden by showing that
a conditional plea agreement is invalid if the power of the court
to approve such an agreement does not exist, or if the condition
itself is so arbitrary as to render it mere chance.
POINT II
IS IT PROPER TO BASE A PLEA BARGAIN NECESSITATING A
PLEA OF GUILT TO A FELONY ON THE BASIS OF A POLYGRAPH
EXAMINATION?
Reference is made to the Record at 0026 which is the report of
the polygraph examination of the defendant.

It should be noted that

according to the report, the defendant was one point over the scale
of conclusive versus inconclusive.

It should also be noted that the

questions asked were formulated in a cumbersome manner because the
defendant was a manager.

At least one question should have asked

if the defendant ever stole money from the company and not the
indirect questions asked which covered legitimate activities of
employment.
-6-

The defendant contends he had an unreviewed examination with
no finding that it met even the standards for a stipulated evidentiary
admission as in State vs. Rebeterano, 681P. 2d 1265 (Utah 1984).
The Tenth Circuit of the United States and several state courts
have disallowed polygraph examinations because of their lack of
acceptance in for reliability in the scientific community.

United

States vs. Hunter, 672 F. 2d 815 (1982); United States vs. Urquidez,
(1973, DC CAL) 356 F. Supp. 1363.

See also; Polyqraphv:

Short

Circuit to Truth. 29 University of Florida, L. Rev. 286, Winter 1977,
and Higleyman, The Deceptive Certaintly of the Lie Detector, 10 Hastings
L J 47.
Whether or not the polygraph is reliable enough by stipulation
to allow into evidence, the plea agreement at issue in effect purports
to be the whole judge of guilt or innocence of the defendant, and
should be void as against public policy.
Defendant is unable to find a case from this jurisdiction
specifically legitimizing an a posteriori conditional plea as being
within the jurisdiction of the trial court and can find no authority
for a conditional plea on the basis of a polygraph.
POINT III
DO THE RESULTS OF THE DEFENDANTS POLYGRAPH INDICATE
DECEPTION PURSUANT TO THE NEGOTIATED PLEA AGREEMENT
HEREIN?
The record of the test results indicated that one examiner found
the defendant a -3 inconclusive, and one found him -6 or conclusive.
If the court is going to authorize this kind of conditional
plea, some procedure should be adopted to question the results in a
a court or to question the form of questions.
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CONCLUSION
The defendant believes this court should overrule the denial
of defendants Motion To Set Aside Plea Of Guilt because he was not
effectively advised of the nature of the polygraph or thequestions
to be asked, and because he was not afforded a hearing on what was
his performance of the test.
The defendant also contends that a conditional plea agreement
calling for an a posteriori passing of a polygraph should be void as
against public policy.

Respectfully Submitted,

John R. Bucher

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing to
David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, SLC, UT.
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ADDENDUM

Utah Code Annotated
77-35-11
JT7-3M1 t a k 11-Fleas.
(a) Upoo i m p m e D i except a case o* a
Cboc, a defendant sbaU be represesaed by j
aaakai tbe attendant w t r a counaef « opa
and Aag not be required to pka4 asstiJ he J
a reasonable time to confer with couaad
tb) A defeadtst mar pkad not fnflry f a
contest, not fnftry by reason of aaeuufy aj
tad mentally 2L A defendant may pkad ml
amative aoc aaAry or act ftxiky by rsa]
tnaanfey If a Adendanx refutes 10 niead j
defendant corpus aiioo fails to appear, tbi
ihaJD enter a pka of not juirry
(c) A defendant ma> pkad DO ootztec am
&e consent of the court
(d) When a defendant enters a plea o f not
(be rate shall forthwith be set for mai Defc
unabk to male bail shaE be gjven a prefena
an early tnaJ Is aon-felony case* tbe not*
advise tbe defendant, or his counsel of tbe r
menu for matin* a written demand for a jury a
(e) Tbe court may refute to accept a jj
guDty or no comes: and shaU DO* accept rock
tnxti] tbe court has made the finding*
0 ) That if the defendant B aoc riptueai
counsel be has knowmfry warded ms raj
counsel tmd does not desire counsel,
(2) Thar the pka u vohmtarihr made;
(3) Thai tbe defendant knows be has11
aaainst compulsory tdf-mcnmmmxxi, to a
tnal and to confront and crocs-exaanme aa
court tbe witnesses against boa, and Tla
entering tbe pka he warves afl of rbofe nants,
(4) Thai tbe defendant understands tbe
and elements of the offense to whK± he n ea
tbe pka, that upon tnai tbe prosecanoc would
the burden of provms; each o4 those ek
beyond a Ttasonabk doubt, and tbat tbe pka
admission of all those element!,
(5) That the defendant knows &e minrrma
majomuir sentence that may be smposed upoi
for each offense to wmch a pka & em
bocrodini tbe posabiiirv of tbe tsfiposjoon cf c
sattive setiieaces, and
(6) Whether the tendered pka a a resaat
pnor pka discusoor and pka axreemerr and 1
rhal agreemen* has been reached
•if u appear* tha tbe prosecutm*; attorney a
other parry has agreed to request or rccommeai
acceptance of a pka to a kate? tacinnVrl offesa
<be dismissal or other cbaifes tbe same sfea
approved by tbe court If recoouacDda.Doas ^
sentence are aOowcd by tbe court, tbe eoarp
advise the defendant persooalh tbat an> recol
ndatKXJ at tc sentence u M* h»Tvfm# rm rK^ /
(fi The sndfe aaaH act aartx^aae at pka daacaaa0& poor to aery apeeiaaa baaoi aaade by tbe propeering aciocaey. but once a taetatrae pka
gr-en>ent baa beea reached wkc± a M i j ^ J i i ^
esp, of a pka a. the a"jniat>oc tbat other eaavaai
r : be dafopped or daaamsed, tbe ^dae, upon
r-^jes of the parues, may permit the discsoture to
uc o^ SBCC Lestxtrve aarten>ent and tbe reasons
fberefor a acrrance of fbe tsaae for tenda of tbe
pea The smdae may tbea sn<bcate to tbe proteanct irtoraey and defense counsei whether be w£D
approve tbe proposed rbyntgyic Tbereaiier, jf tbe
ydgc ckckfai tbat fmaJ daapoaiDoc ahooid aot be
landbd a cmforanry wan tbe pka a^rt^ment, be
till sc adrac tbe defeodanl and then call upoc tbe
tfirndant to eabex afHrm or wabdraw hu pka. rm

Utah Code Annotated

77-l3_6

•"-13-4 Wit—rawd rf pit*. .
' A pea of not prik) MT be withdraws a
brae pnor to cotmenoa. A pica of pair? <
oooten nay he mtMinm^mitj
spaa food
Aowa aad vfca tare of c

Utah Code Annotated

78-2-2

frt-2-2 Jurisdiction - Origtaal and appellate.
The Supreme Court shalf Save oXaTjurisdict <
.on to ,ssue writ* of mandamus, certiorari ' £ £ 2 *
uon. quo warranto and habeas corpus. £ c W .he

judge thereof. In otocr c a £ * « t * ^

""F1"

U
^e ^ . U t e ^ r i S n ^ r S m ^
fwrase of such appellate jurisd.cuon may S J S

I of guard.anSh.p, and shall have power to s s u T S
te"i»
T ^ f ° r t f i e ^ " " ^ " o r that S I r.onfoS.awTndtct

8

^

^

^

